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DEFINING DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
AND INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY UNDER
TITLE IX
LAUREN MCCOY*

INTRODUCTION
When the Obama administration released a Dear Colleague letter in 2011,
they sought to inform schools and universities of their responsibilities to address
sexual harassment under Title IX.1 Sexual harassment includes acts of sexual
violence and are considered another form of sex discrimination occurring in
educational programs and activities.2 Incidents on college campuses, at this
time, were so prevalent that a National Institute of Justice report found that
about one in five women in college are victims of completed or attempted sexual
assault.3 Title IX requires educational institutions to prevent and promptly
correct peer-to-peer sexual harassment with a notice of nondiscrimination, at
least one designated employee to coordinate efforts to comply with the law, and
adopt and publish grievance procedures for student and employee sex
discrimination complaints.4
Unfortunately, the warnings and guidance provided by this Dear Colleague
letter did not effectively address sexual harassment as seen by the survey report
requested by Senator Claire McCaskill in 2014.5 This report highlighted that
*Assistant Professor of Sport Management and Program Director, Sport and Fitness Administration,
Winthrop University, Rock Hill, S.C.
1. Russlynn Ali, Assistant Secretary, Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence, OFF FOR CIV RTS.,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague201104.pdf (Rescinded) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter].
2. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR C.R., KNOW YOUR RIGHTS: TITLE IX PROHIBITS SEXUAL
HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE WHERE YOU GO TO SCHOOL, at 1 https://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/docs/title-ix-rights-201104.pdf (Rescinded). This article will use the terms sexual
harassment, sexual violence, and sexual misconduct interchangeably to refer to actions that qualify as
sex discrimination under Title IX.
3. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 1.
4. Id.; see also 34 C.F.R. § 106.8 (2021); 34 C.F.R. § 106.9 (2021).
5. CLAIRE MCCASKILL, U.S. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON FIN. & CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT, SEXUAL
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universities were failing to address sexual violence by not encouraging students
to report assaults, lacking adequate training and services for survivors and
failing to investigate claims that were reported.6 Distressingly, the report
uncovered that in the three years after the Dear Colleague letter warned
educational institutions about the need to provide coordinated oversight to
address sexual harassment on campus, more than 10% of the institutions
covered in the national sample did not have a Title IX coordinator.7
The Department of Education (DOE) released two additional guidance
documents to supplement the 2011 Dear Colleague letter: the 2014 Questions
and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence and a 2015 Dear Colleague letter.
These documents were intended to address a university’s legal obligations
related to sexual harassment and clarify the responsibilities of the required Title
IX coordinator respectively.8 While these documents were intended to provide
clarity, the change in presidential administration in 2016 led to new
interpretations of Title IX and growing uncertainty of responsibilities under the
law. In 2017, the Trump administration rescinded all previous documents
developed by the Obama administration under Title IX, including the 2011 and
2015 Dear Colleague letters and the 2014 Questions and Answers document.9
New regulations were published in 2020 to replace those documents.10 Finally,
the Biden administration announced that they would be rewriting the Title IX
sexual misconduct rules in June 2021.11 These changing regulations could be
VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS: HOW TOO MANY INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION ARE FAILING TO
PROTECT STUDENTS (July 9, 2014), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2014-07-09%20
Sexual%20Violence%20on%20Campus%20Survey%20Report%20with%20Appendix.pdf.
6. Id. at 1.
7. Id. at 2.
8. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR C.R., QUESTION AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-titleix.pdf (Rescinded); Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Secretary, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Department
of Education, & Vanita Gupta, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office for Civil Rights, U.S.
Department of Justice, Dear Colleague Letter: English Learner Students and Limited English Proficient
Parents, OFF. FOR CIV. RTS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 7, 2015),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-el-201501.pdf (Rescinded).
9. Nick Anderson, Trump Administration Rescinds Obama-Era Guidance on Campus Sexual
Assault, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trumpadministration-rescinds-obama-era-guidance-on-campus-sexual-assault/2017/09/22/43c5c8fa-9faa11e7-8ea1-ed975285475e_story.html.
10. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal
Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30,026 (May 19, 2020) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. at pt. 106); See
also U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR C.R., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REGARDING THE
DEPARTMENT’S FINAL TITLE IX RULE (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
docs/qa-titleix-20200904.pdf.
11. Lauren Camera, Education Department Begins Sweeping Rewrite of Title IX Sexual Misconduct
Rules, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 7, 2021), https://www.usnews.com/news/educationnews/articles/2021-06-07/education-department-begins-sweeping-rewrite-of-title-ix-sexualmisconduct-rules.
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viewed as the primary cause for the failure of educational institutions to address
sexual misconduct and the consistent statistics highlighting sexual misconduct
as a growing problem. However, the 2017 and 2020 changes did not remove
legal responsibility but changed the focus to complaints of misconduct
occurring within an educational program instead of any misconduct involving
students and provided stricter standards for proving those claims.12
Failure to properly follow Title IX guidelines or have the correct systems in
place can lead to systemic failures at many institutions. Recently, some of the
more infamous examples of these failures involve athletic department
employees or student-athletes.13 Their public-facing nature makes it appear as
though these issues are solely focused on sport, but often sport is just the lens
used to view a systemic campus-wide problem. A USA Today investigation into
sexual misconduct allegations at Louisiana State University (LSU) uncovered
athletic department officials ignoring abusers while also denying victim
requests for protections.14 This was only one layer of the problem. Even when
those accused of sexual misconduct were investigated and found guilty by the
university, their punishments were lenient.15 Three male students, not athletes,
received deferred sanctions when expulsion or suspension would have been
appropriate.16 An independent report from Husch Blackwell noted that the LSU
Title IX system was built to fail because of their failure to adequately address
any of the legal requirements for preventing and promptly correcting sexual
misconduct under Title IX.17
Highly publicized cases of systemic failures to address sexual misconduct
on campus are costly in terms of goodwill and public trust, along with any
financial penalties. Michigan State University received a $4.5 million fine from
the Department of Education after fumbling their response to a serial predator

12. Greta Anderson, U.S. Publishes New Regulations on Campus Sexual Assault, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (May 7, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/05/07/education-department-releasesfinal-title-ix-regulations.
13. See, e.g., JESSICA LUTHER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: COLLEGE FOOTBALL AND THE
POLITICS OF RAPE (2016); Kenny Jacoby, Nancy Armour & Jessica Luther, LSU Mishandled Sexual
Misconduct Complaints Against Students, Including Top Athletes, USA TODAY (Nov. 16, 2020, 5:00
AM), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/sports/ncaaf/2020/11/16/lsu-ignored-campus-sexual-assault
-allegations-against-derrius-guice-drake-davis-other-students/6056388002/; Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, A
Record Fine for Underreporting Sex Crimes, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 6, 2019),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/09/06/education-department-fines-michigan-state-45million-not-reporting-nassar-crimes.
14. Jacoby, Armour & Luther, supra note 13.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. HUSCH BLACKWELL, LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY TITLE IX REVIEW 3-4 (Mar. 3, 2021),
https://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/theadvocate.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/b/
65/b657e612-7dd4-11eb-8b0a-b7159915b29b/604264e32d74f.pdf.pdf.
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working in the athletic department.18 This fine is the largest ever given under
the Clery Act, legislation requiring institutions to publicize violent acts and
provide crime data.19 Additionally, Michigan State University was required to
rework their Title IX office including an independent review of their strategies
to determine if those processes complied with legal standards under Title IX.20
The $4.5 million fine was in addition to $500 million set aside as a civil
settlement for more than 300 of Nassar’s victims.21 The university is still being
sued by more than 100 women.22
The financial impact of Title IX sexual assault lawsuits can be burdensome
to a university, especially when budgets are tight. United Educators, a memberowned insurance cooperative, studied about 1,000 cases of student reported
sexual assault from 2011 to 2015 and found that fewer than 100 cases led to
monetary losses for the university.23 But those that did, cost the universities over
$21 million with several singular incidents, costing a university more than $1
million.24 While universities have had more time to prepare and correct issues
with their sexual misconduct investigatory procedures and provide ample
education to students about these procedures, similar lawsuits continue to be
filed. The evidence of legal claims does not always lead to liability, but can
these incidents help determine what is considered a violation? How often are
systemic failings under Title IX leading to legal responsibility in civil courts? If
the threat of Department of Education investigations is not encouraging
compliance, can increased civil liability and the related financial costs spur
action?
Section I of this Article will discuss the history of Title IX sexual assault
legislation, including how courts decided on the deliberate indifference
standard. Section II will expand and discuss how deliberate indifference has
been defined in practice, along with summarizing the success of a plaintiff’s
deliberate indifference claims. Section III will conclude with a discussion on
whether deliberate indifference remains an effective method for addressing a
university’s responsibility under Title IX and other avenues available to
plaintiffs.

18. Bauer-Wolf, supra note 13.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Emily Tate, The High (Dollar) Cost of Sexual Assault, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/04/06/sexual-assault-claims-can-be-costly.
24. Id.

MCCOY 32.1

2021]

1/11/22 5:49 PM

DEFINING DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

145

SECTION I
Under Title IX, the statutory language highlights administrative
enforcement to ensure that federal funding is not used at institutions
discriminating on the basis of sex with the Department of Education as the main
driver of enforcement.25 The purpose of the Department of Education’s
administration is to provide schools and universities the opportunity to correct
non-compliant policies and practices.26 This corrective action limits the need for
financial penalties or loss of funding. Currently, no program has ever lost federal
funding due to Title IX compliance concerns.27
As the Department of Education focuses on rehabilitation, the Supreme
Court declared that a private right of action was intended by Congress to
supplement compliance.28 The initial aim of Title IX was to address
discrimination in terms of access to educational programs, such as admissions
to a program.29 Allowing students to sue here followed the intentions of
Congress while also providing additional incentive for schools and universities
to provide effective protection against discrimination.30 Sexual harassment was
later added as a category of sex discrimination covered under the private right
of action by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Yale University.31 The plaintiffs
in Alexander argued that the absence of a sexual harassment grievance
procedure violated their rights of equal access to education under Title IX.32 As
a result, their preferred remedy was injunctive relief to establish procedures to
respond to student sexual harassment complaints.33 While Alexander
established the standard requiring institutional responsibility for student sexual
harassment, these rights were extended to include monetary damages or
injunctive relief in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools to provide
increased incentive to educational institutions to address sexual harassment
claims.34 However, at the time, there was no operational standard to define how

25. Erin E. Buzuvis, Title IX and Official Policy Liability: Maximizing the Law’s Potential to Hold
Education Institutions Accountable for Their Responses to Sexual Misconduct, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 35,
37-38 (2020).
26. Id. at 38.
27. Id.
28. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979).
29. Id. at 694-98.
30. Id. at 704.
31. Alexander v. Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1980).
32. Id. at 180-82.
33. Id. at 181.
34. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 63, 65, 72, 76 (1992); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, In Their Hands: Restoring Institutional Liability for Sexual Harassment in Education, 125
YALE L.J. 2038, 2062-63 (2016).
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schools should act or how they should address sexual harassment grievances.35
They simply needed to have these policies in place.
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District further defined these
responsibilities, establishing the deliberate indifference standard.36 To
determine whether the school district has responsibility to address and prevent
teacher-student sexual harassment, the Supreme Court established a standard of
deliberate indifference.37 The remedies provided under Title IX are predicated
by notice to an appropriate person and an opportunity to address the situation.38
Should an administrative official tasked with hearing Title IX complaints fail to
address those concerns or provide action to remedy them, those actions would
qualify as being deliberately indifferent.39 The key in this standard is the
school’s knowledge of the forbidden conduct. After Gebser joined a book
discussion led by a teacher, Frank Waldrop, who made sexually suggestive
comments to students. Those comments after time became increasingly focused
on her and led to a sexual relationship between the two.40 Her relationship with
Waldrop was not reported to school officials, but parents of other students in
the discussion complained about his inappropriate comments.41 The relationship
with Gebser only became public after the two were seen engaging in sexual
conduct by a police officer.42 Since the knowledge of the relationship between
Gebser and her teacher was not provided before they were discovered by a third
party, the district was not found deliberately indifferent.43
This private right of action was extended to include peer-to-peer sexual
harassment in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education.44 Liability for peerto-peer sexual harassment hinges on the conduct of school officials, like the
qualifications provided for teacher-student sexual harassment. The respondents
argued that this suit was trying to hold the school responsible for a third party’s
actions.45 The majority, using the Gebser standard of deliberate indifference,
disagreed and declared that deliberate indifference focuses on the responsibility
of the school due to their control over the alleged harassment.46 The petitioner
was subjected to prolonged sexual harassment from a classmate that began in
35. See Mackinnon, supra note 34.
36. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).
37. Id. at 277.
38. Id. at 289-90.
39. Id. at 290-91.
40. Id. at 277-78.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 291.
44. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
45. Id. at 640-41.
46. Id.

MCCOY 32.1

2021]

1/11/22 5:49 PM

DEFINING DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

147

December of 1992 and included attempts to touch her breasts and genital area
while making lewd comments.47 Each incident was reported by the petitioner to
her mother and her teacher. The school’s principal was also informed of the
behavior, but no disciplinary action occurred.48 Deliberate indifference in this
context must subject the student to continued harassment or make them
vulnerable to additional harassment.49 Therefore, a school official needs to have
the authority to remedy a situation before deliberate indifference is a viable
option for a plaintiff.50
The petitioner’s claim in Davis was remanded to the Eleventh Circuit
because the complaint suggested the petitioner could show both actual
knowledge and deliberate indifference in the school’s response to her
harassment.51 School administrators and officials were given prior notice of the
potential liability for peer-to-peer student harassment in March of 1993, which
is within the window of the harassment in this case.52 The National School
Boards Association published a guide to be used by school attorneys and
administrators to explain the law regarding sexual harassment of employees and
students and when those officials could be liable under Title IX for their failure
to respond.53 The school made no effort to prevent future harassment or remove
the petitioner from the situation.
Deliberate indifference was never intended to be a catch-all policy requiring
schools to be directly responsible for sexual misconduct on campus. The court
in Davis cautioned against the probability of school liability for all sexual
misconduct.54 Instead, schools continue to exercise discretion unless those
actions were clearly unreasonable under the circumstances.55 This flexible
standard, while cautious, has made deliberate indifference difficult to define as
a specific standard of care to be followed by all institutions. Liability often
hinges upon actual notice of misconduct and failing to respond accordingly or
in a “clearly unreasonable” manner.56 The Supreme Court in Davis continued
by highlighting that deliberate indifference is not a mere reasonableness
standard but allows the school to remain flexible to account for the level of
disciplinary authority available and the potential liability created through

47. Id. at 634-35.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 644-45.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 653-54.
52. Id. at 647.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 648-49.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 649.
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exercising certain disciplinary actions.57 This may be difficult for a plaintiff to
prove, especially if the school has taken some action or a repeat perpetrator does
not offend in a similar manner for additional incidents. Further, many victims
fail to report sexual misconduct based on a belief that school officials won’t take
their concerns seriously. That reputation exacerbates the problem while
allowing schools to avoid liability because of a lack of knowledge regarding a
specific event.
SECTION II
One of the most challenging aspects of sexual harassment grievance and
assessing resulting liability are the variety of forms this harassment can take on
a college campus.58 Opinions may vary on what behavior qualifies as sexual
harassment versus a friendly, but misplaced, gesture.59 Further, victims of
harassment may feel pressured to respond in socially appropriate ways to
maintain politeness or based on a belief that what occurred wasn’t serious if it
did not involve forced penetration.60 This could blur the lines of unacceptable
or unreasonable responding behavior for universities. The majority in Davis
highlighted that in an appropriate case, courts would be able to identify a
response as clearly unreasonable as a matter of law.61 However, in practice, this
standard used to define deliberate indifference has not led to consistent patterns
in the circuits or easy circumstances for courts to define on a motion to dismiss
for summary judgment.62
Establishing deliberate indifference under Title IX requires 1) actual notice
to an appropriate individual who has the power to act to remedy the harassment
and 2) a failure to act by that appropriate individual.63 Because actual notice
must be given to the individual with the power to utilize the grievance process,
this could insulate schools from liability if the report did not go through the
procedures provided. For example, if a coach or another university employee
finds out about harassment involving one of their players and decides to address
the issue themselves instead of reaching out to the Title IX coordinator, this

57. Id.
58. Lisa Fedina, Jennifer L. Holmes & Bethany Backes, How Prevalent is Campus Sexual Assault
in the United States, 277 NAT. INS. OF JUST. 1, 4 (2016), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249827.pdf.
59. Id.
60. Carol B. Mills & Joseph N. Scudder, He Said, She Said: The Effectiveness & Outcomes of
Responses to Sexual Harassment, INT. J. BUS. COMMC’N, (2020).; see also MacKinnon, supra note 34
at 2053-61.
61. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 648-49 (1999).
62. MacKinnon, supra note 34, at 2067-85.
63. Davis, 526 U.S. at 644-45.
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could be interpreted as the school lacking actual notice about the issue.64
Under the regulations provided by the Obama administration, certain
individuals on campuses, like coaches and faculty members in daily direct
contact with students were considered mandatory reporters.65 This distinction
provided that once those employees were informed about sexual misconduct,
they would have to report the misconduct to the Title IX office where an
investigation could begin.66 The victims were given the option to not pursue an
investigation and could be fully informed of the options available to them.67
However, under the new standards released in 2020, there is no specification
about who qualifies as a mandatory reporter.68 Schools could leave policies in
place that make all employees responsible, or it could be left to the student to
directly report issues to the Title IX office.69 While college students may be
mature enough to make this decision, this policy does not consider student
hesitation or politeness that stops them from seeking protections they need. The
lack of clear definition, as to which employees are required to report incidents
of sexual misconduct, will allow some cases to fall through the cracks and allow
schools to avoid claims of deliberate indifference because actual notice was not
provided.
Additionally, the failure to act essentially needs to appear as an official
decision to decline action to qualify as deliberately indifferent. The baseline of
clearly unreasonable behavior suggests that if schools do something to address
the harassment, there will be judicial deference to those actions.70 It remains
unclear what that something needs to be, whether it be a substantial effort to
address the harassment including limiting contact between the alleged victim or
perpetrator, or merely filing a report and trying to avoid the same incident
occurring again. The sometimes subjective nature of what qualifies as sexual
harassment seems incongruous with the responsibility given to schools to
provide equal access and a safe environment for all. This gives schools
64. Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, 859 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that campus security officers
were not appropriate persons for notice under Title IX). Under the 2020 Title IX Guidelines, coaches,
athletic directors, faculty, and staff are no longer considered mandatory reporters. They are not required
to report allegations of sexual misconduct, leaving reporting to the victim. See Nondiscrimination on
the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, supra
note 10.
65. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR C.R., QUESTION AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 8.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. R. Shep Melnick, Analyzing the Department of Education’s Final Title IX Rules on Sexual
Misconduct, BROOKINGS (June 1, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/analyzing-thedepartment-of-educations-final-title-ix-rules-on-sexual-misconduct/.
69. Id.
70. See MacKinnon, supra note 34, at 2067-85.
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continuing flexibility in their decision-making in a way that may not prioritize
or incentivize an effective response to sexual misconduct.
In an examination of federal cases in district and appellate courts that
significantly discuss deliberate indifference from Gebser through the end of
May 2014, MacKinnon found that the plaintiff student’s case was dismissed on
summary judgment in 140 cases.71 While her research does not highlight how
many plaintiffs were successful once their cases were considered on the merits,
those initial cases were summary judgments granted in favor of the defendant
university.72 This is a consistent result across all federal circuits.73
Two recent cases from the Sixth Circuit signify the inconsistent definitions
provided under the deliberate indifference standard and how those patterns tend
to benefit a defendant university.74 Both cases involve peer-to-peer sexual
harassment while the aggressor was under university control.75 While the
harassment in each case varies, the main concern is when can a school be held
liable for responding to reports of sexual harassment because the results
provided in these two cases appear to be contradictory with more decisive action
taken by the university, who initially lost their motion to dismiss.76 Both
universities ultimately prevailed and further highlighted the idea that deliberate
indifference requires only some reasonable response with little consideration for
the effectiveness of that response.77
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. As a part of the research for this article, the author examined at least two cases in each circuit
from 2003 on that discuss deliberate indifference under Title IX in detail. If a plaintiff was successful,
there was another case in the same circuit siding with the defendant university. Only the Fourth Circuit
included two cases that were remanded for further proceedings after a finding that the plaintiff produced
a genuine issue of material fact related to the defendant’s deliberate indifference. See Doe v. Brown
Univ., 896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018); Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Cmte., 504 F.3d 165 (1st Cir. 2007);
Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 2003); Papelino v. Albany College of Pharmacy of
Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2011); Bostic v. Smyrna Sch. Dist., 418 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2005);
Doe v. Trs. of Univ. of Pa., 270 F.Supp.3d 799 (2017); Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d
674 (4th Cir. 2018); Doe ex rel. v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2000); Sanches v.
Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep., 647 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579
(6th Cir. 2018); Foster v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Mich., 952 F.3d 765 (6th Cir. 2020); Kollaritsch
v. Mich. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 944 F. 3d 613 (6th Cir. 2019); Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668 (7th
Cir. 2004); Doe v. St. Francis Sch. Dist., 694 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2012); KT v. Culver-Stockton Coll.,
865 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2017); Roe v. St. Louis Univ., 746 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2014); Karasek v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 956 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2020); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736
(9th Cir. 2000); Escue v. N. Ok. Coll., 450 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2006); Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, 859
F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2017); Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., Fla., 604 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2010);
Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948 (11th Cir. 2015).
74. Kollaritsch v. Mich. St. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 944 F.3d 613 (6th Cir. 2019); Foster v. Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Mich., 982 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
75. Kollaritsch, 944 F.3d at 618; Foster, 982 F.3d at 962.
76. See Foster v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Mich., 952 F.3d 765 (6th Cir. 2020).
77. Id.

MCCOY 32.1

2021]

1/11/22 5:49 PM

DEFINING DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

151

First, the Sixth Circuit ruled that a school’s response to sexual harassment
must fail to protect the student from actual further harassment for their actions
to be deliberately indifferent in Kollaritsch v. Michigan State University.78 This
lawsuit was the result of four peer-to-peer sexual assaults at Michigan State
University. Each incident was reported to campus police and was investigated
by the proper administrative authorities on campus.79 However, one of the
plaintiffs was “stalked, harassed and/or intimidated” by her harasser at least nine
times after her initial report.80 An investigation was conducted into the
retaliation claims, where it was found that no retaliation occurred, even though
the two lived in the same dormitory and used the same cafeteria and public
areas. The university administrator in charge of this case informed her that
there’s a difference between retaliation and just seeing her harasser, suggesting
that she needed mental health services.81 Here, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
deliberate indifference would be present only if that indifference led to another
actionable claim of sexual misconduct.82 There were no details provided that
established these encounters to be sexual, severe, or even objectively
unreasonable.83
Similarly, in Foster v. Board of Regents of the University of Michigan, the
Sixth Circuit initially reversed a grant of summary judgment and remanded the
case after establishing that the plaintiff, Foster, established a genuine issue of
material fact about the university’s deliberate indifference in response to similar
repeated incidents of harassment.84 A later rehearing en banc affirmed the
district court’s ruling that the university was not deliberately indifferent in their
response to the harassment.85 Foster and her harasser took part in an off-site
executive MBA program based in Los Angeles, California.86 These students met
once a month in weekend residency sessions taking place at the Beverly
Wilshire hotel in Beverly Hills.87 While Foster and her fellow student were
initially friendly, but after expressing romantic interest, the respondent made
unwanted physical contact with Foster on many occasions, starting in December
2013.88 Foster reported the harassment to the university on March 13, 2014,

78. Kollaritsch, 944 F.3d at 622.
79. Id. at 624-25.
80. Id. at 624.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 624-25.
83. Id. at 624.
84. Foster v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Mich., 952 F.3d 765 (6th Cir. 2020).
85. Foster v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Mich., 982 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
86. Id. at 962.
87. Id. at 971.
88. Id. at 962-63.
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providing evidence of the continued harassment.89 The university began an
investigation where they interviewed both parties and then ordered the harasser
to not contact Foster.90 He violated this order by contacting Foster via text.91
This text was reported to the university who reprimanded him for violating this
order.92
For the remaining session of the program, the university housed the harasser
in another hotel.93 He was not permitted to eat meals with the rest of the cohort
and sat in class out of Foster’s sightline.94 After a follow-up expressing concern
for her safety and a desire to not be in the same room with her harasser, the
university offered additional accommodations including finishing the program
at the Ann Arbor campus.95 This option was provided to both Foster and the
respondent, and both declined.96 After the respondent violated the no-contact
order again, the university banned him from the last day of the program and
later prohibited him from attending the commencement ceremony in Ann Arbor
after a series of emails to classmates and university administrators.97 The
harasser ignored this ban as well, showing up to the hotel prior to graduation,
and he was forced to board a plane back to California once discovered.98 With
the final investigative report issued on May 1, the university imposed a
permanent no-contact order, banned him from campus for three years, banned
him from any University sponsored event attended by Foster, and placed a
notation that he committed sexual misconduct on his transcript.99
The Sixth Circuit in Foster noted that it is not a university’s job to remove
all harassment but to respond in good faith when allegations occur.100 Here, the
university acted as soon as they were aware of the harassment in March using
interim protective measures while investigating Foster’s claims. The delay in
responding may have led to the increased harassment but the university could
not act until provided actual knowledge of an issue. The fact that the university
imposed increasingly more restrictive measures after the harasser violated
orders to stay away shows that they did what was best and possible under the
circumstances to protect Foster. Further, the Sixth Circuit compared this case to
89. Id. at 966.
90. Id. at 963.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 964.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 965.
99. Id.
100. Foster v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 982 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
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others where the school was less proactive and still prevailed in court like in
Kollaritsch. In both instances, if the school took some proactive steps to protect
the victim from further harassment, then their actions will not be viewed as
deliberately indifferent.101
The mere presence of harassers in the same area as a plaintiff is not enough
to establish the need for a response from the school, meaning the University of
Michigan’s response in Foster went above and beyond the legal requirement set
by the Sixth Circuit. An argument could be made that Michigan State’s policies
surrounding investigating sexual assault were generally ineffective because
Kollaritsch reported her assault to Michigan State in January 2012, which
includes the same period covered in the university’s record-setting fine under
the Clery Act related to Dr. Larry Nassar.102 What’s different between these two
cases and why the university was not found to be deliberately indifferent here
is the fact that the university did investigate Kollaritsch’s claims and disciplined
the accuser. Their fine under the Clery Act is based on the failure to disclose
crime statistics.103 This again highlights the premise that if a university does
something, and that something appears to be a good faith response to the
allegations, then deliberate indifference will not be found.
SECTION III
Existing case law shows us that a finding of deliberate indifference is rare
and only associated with consistent evidence that a school did not respond to a
sexual misconduct claim at all.104 Judicial deference gives the school a lot of
leeway to determine what is an appropriate response in these circumstances,
especially because the varying nature of fact scenarios that could be reported
means that the school should have some flexibility in their response. As long as
preventive measures are taken in good faith as soon as the university is made
aware of a complaint, they will be protected from a claim of deliberate
indifference.
Under this standard, a university’s success on the merits is not limited to
plaintiff victims challenging the response to their report, but also includes
plaintiffs who were accused of misconduct and were subject to disciplinary
proceedings.105 In cases involving plaintiffs accused of misconduct, it is not
101. Kollaritsch, 944 F.3d at 618; Foster, 952 F.3d at 778.
102. Bauer-Wolf, supra note 13.
103. Id.
104. See MacKinnon, supra note 34 at 2067-85.
105. See e.g., Doe v. Miami Univ.¸882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that deliberate indifference
requires sexual misconduct where the plaintiff is the victim not the alleged aggressor); Doe v. Columbia
Univ., 831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that schools cannot act with bias based on sex when
investigating and responding to claims of sexual assault).
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surprising that disciplinary proceedings used against those individuals did not
constitute deliberate indifference because a key component of this theory is that
the indifference is directly related to sexual assault experienced, not caused, by
the plaintiff. Additionally, it is another example of courts refusing to impose
judgment on discretionary matters.
Judicial determination of deliberate indifference has ultimately not created
an effective deterrent for schools to improve their Title IX processes. These
standards often appear to require a bare minimum, focused on reacting to
incidents as they occur not the prevention of future incidents. While this seems
disheartening publicly speaking, it follows the same problems associated with
addressing sexual misconduct in other areas of society.106 Even when judicial
rulings extend the requirements for university responsibility under Title IX, it
does so with built-in caveats.
In Karasek v. Regents of the University of California, the Ninth Circuit
established a test for pre-assault deliberate indifference after three plaintiffs who
were assaulted as undergraduates at the University of California-Berkeley filed
suit against the University.107 They argued that the university failed to
adequately respond to their individual claims of sexual assault and maintained
a policy of deliberate indifference when addressing these claims.108 That
indifference created a higher risk and likelihood that the plaintiffs would be
assaulted while attending the university.109 Initially, the Ninth Circuit noted that
pre-assault liability exists when the school maintains a policy of deliberate
indifference to reports of sexual misconduct that creates a heightened risk of
sexual harassment in an area under the university’s control and a plaintiff is
harassed as a result.110 This standard was amended in a subsequent opinion
issued in April 2021 to add that the harassment should be “so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive that it can be said to [have] deprive[d] the [plaintiff]
of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”111
This change was made to ensure that not every claim of harassment would be
eligible for pre-assault indifference under Title IX, but instead the focus would
be on the actions of universities creating a clearly unreasonable risk of harm to
students.112 Notably, the Ninth Circuit did not find deliberate indifference here
in connection to the university’s response to the sexual assault report by the

106. Alison Gash & Ryan Harding, #MeToo? Legal Discourse and Everyday Responses to Sexual
Violence, MDPI (May 21, 2018), https://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/7/2/21/htm.
107. Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 956 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2020).
108. Id. at 1112-13.
109. Id. at 1103.
110. Id. at 1111-12 (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 650).
111. Id. at 1112 (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 650).
112. Id. at 1098.
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individual plaintiffs because investigations did occur and the response was not
clearly unreasonable.113
This pre-assault liability based on university policy is connected to a lesserknown Title IX theory of liability: official policy liability.114 This theory was
first successfully used in Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder when the
court recognized that responsibility under Title IX is not just for an indifferent
response but for misconduct that occurs due to ineffective policies.115 In
Simpson, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that there was sufficient
evidence to support the findings that the university maintained an official policy
that increased the likelihood of sexual misconduct.116 The university had an
official policy of showing high school recruits “a good time” on their campus
visits and did not adequately supervise player-hosts in a manner that allowed
that “good time” to include the alleged sexual assault of other students.117 The
plaintiffs in this case were assaulted by football players and high school students
on one of these recruiting trips.118 Proper notice to address these issues was
available to the university because this was not the first recruiting trip leading
to misconduct with prior assaults reported in 1990 and 1997 along with a
meeting in 1998 with university officials to discuss the need to supervise these
visits and implement sexual assault prevention training with the football team
to avoid future incidents.119 The Tenth Circuit found that the university had done
nothing to address these concerns.120 This follows the same standards provided
under deliberate indifference where a violation is present only if the university
fails to respond. Simpson was remanded to a lower court for consideration on
the merit and the parties settled the suit on December 5, 2007 for $2.5 million.121
The changing nature of guidelines surrounding Title IX makes it difficult
for universities to have a consistent procedure for addressing reports of sexual
misconduct on campus. However, this inconsistency rarely leads to legal
liability.122 Financial liability through public relations and legal settlements
continues to be a concern.123 The amount of judicial deference provided gives
schools cover for their actions if they have provided some response that can
113. Id. at 1106-07.
114. See Buzuvis, supra note 25.
115. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
116. Id. at 1173.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1180-85.
120. Id.
121. Ebonee Avery-Washington, Court Case: Lisa Simpson, et al. v. Univ. of Colo., AAUW (Feb.
2005), https://ww3.aauw.org/resource/lisa-simpson-et-al-v-university-of-colorado/.
122. See MacKinnon, supra note 34, at 2067-85.
123. See Tate, supra note 23.

MCCOY 32.1

156

1/11/22 5:49 PM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32.1

reasonably be considered effective, similar to the Department of Education’s
focus on education over punishment as a deterrent to failed Title IX policies. As
a result, deliberate indifference will likely not be present, even in environments
where universities are failing to consistently address sexual misconduct as seen
at LSU and Michigan State recently. The public perception of a massive
problem is not enough to declare that a legal problem exists. Hindsight may
highlight specific problems; however, judicial deference focuses on not
monitoring those who are failing to meet their responsibility, but on those who
refuse to act at all.

